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JURISDICTION 
This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has Jurisdiction to decide cross-
appellants' appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Issue: Did the trial court err in failing to apply the doctrine of practical 
construction in its interpretation of the Combined Agreement, when faced with the 
absence of the identification in the Combined Agreement, itself, as to whom 
commission payments were intended to be made? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of a contract presents 
a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 
50 1J16, 84 P.3d 1134, 1140. 
2. Issue: Is the trial court's finding no. 23, that the commission payments 
under the Combined Agreement were intended to be paid 50% to PCG and 50% to 
appellant, rather than 100% to appellant, supported by substantial evidence? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's factual findings are reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. Washington County Water Conservancy District v. Morgan, 
2003 UT 58 ^23,82 P.3d 1125, 1132. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b): Defenses and objections. How presented. 
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, 
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is 
required, except that the following defenses may at the option of 
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the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper 
venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making 
any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further 
pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being 
joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a 
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the 
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim 
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a 
responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any 
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion 
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the 
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment 
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be 
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent 
to such a motion by Rule 56. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(h). Waiver of Defenses. 
A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by 
motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of 
failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to 
state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later 
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the 
pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that 
the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall 
dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, 
shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any 
evidence that may have been received. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 17(a). Parties plaintiff and defendant. Real party in interest. 
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an 
express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has 
been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by 
statute may sue in that person's name without joining the party for 
whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so 
provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be 
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brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be 
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after 
objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or 
joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such 
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if 
the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in 
interest. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 25(c). Substitution of parties. Transfer of interest. 
Transfer of interest. In case of any transfer of interest, the action 
may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court 
upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred 
to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party. 
Service of the motion shall be made as provided in Subdivision (a) 
of this rule. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case arises out of a contract to sell a physicians' billing service, Physician's 
Control Group, Inc. ("PCG") by Cross-Appellant and Appellee David L. Orlob ("Orlob"), 
to Appellants and Cross-Appellees Wasatch Management ("Wasatch"), Kenneth C. 
Jensen ("Ken"), Earlene B. Jensen ("Earlene"), Steven K. Jensen ("Steve"), and Keven 
J. Jensen ("Keven"), (collectively the "Jensens). The Jensens did not want to assume 
any of the outstanding liabilities of PCG, so they refused to purchase the stock in PCG, 
of which Orlob was the sole owner, and instead structured an asset purchase. 
Compensation to Orlob for the asset purchase was designed, as is common for such 
transactions to avoid double taxation, to be paid in the form of monthly commissions, 
for about five years, in exchange for Orlob assisting with the transfer of the business to 
the Jensens and for Orlob providing a covenant not to compete with the Jensens for ten 
years. 
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To effectuate this plan, PCG, Orlob, individually, Wasatch, and Ken, Earlene, 
Steve and Keven, individually, each executed an agreement entitled the "Combined 
Agreement." The Jensens commenced making the monthly commission payments 
under the Combined Agreement directly to Orlob, individually. Differences arose 
surrounding Orlob's advice to the Jensens on how to protect the goodwill and contract 
pricing of PCG, and disputes arose between Orlob and the Jensens, including a 
claimed breach by Orlob of the covenant not to compete, with both parties claiming the 
other had breached. PCG, which received no commission payments under the 
Combined Agreement, and had no bank account, employees or business, was allowed 
by Orlob to be administratively dissolved by the state. The Jensens continued to make 
commission payments to Orlob under the Combined Agreement, with certain 
adjustments they claimed made them whole for Orlob's alleged breaches, however, 
until the Internal Revenue Service placed a lien on PCG's interest in the Combined 
Agreement, and sold that interest to the Jensens. At that point, the Jensens ceased 
making commission payments to Orlob, and Orlob sued to recover the commission 
payments that represented the remaining consideration for his sale of his physician's 
billing service. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On November 6, 2000, the trial court granted a final judgment, on summary 
judgment against Orlob, ruling that he had no individual interest under the Combined 
Agreement and dismissing the Jensens counterclaims by stipulation, without prejudice 
to renewing them after appeal if the case came back. Orlob filed with the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court on 
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November 14, 2000. The case was poured over by the Utah Supreme Court to this 
Court for decision. 
On October 4, 2001, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's finding, 
on summary judgment, that Orlob had no individual interest under the Combined 
Agreement, in Orlob v. Wasatch Management, 2001 UT App. 287, 33 P.3d 1078 
("Orlob /"). This Court reversed, as follows: 
The parties attached greater value to the covenants to assist in the 
transfer and maintenance of accounts and not to compete. 
Without these covenants, whatever good will and reputation being 
transferred could be undermined by competition from either Orlob 
or PCG. The parties agreed that the covenants of the Combined 
Agreement were worth more than $500,000 during its term. 
Without Orlob's personal covenants and promises, and 
personal assistance and involvement, the agreement would 
have little value. Thus, we conclude that Orlob has an individual 
interest in the Combined Agreement, which is tied to his covenants 
to assist in the transfer and maintenance of accounts and not to 
compete. 
fl 20 We conclude the Combined Agreement unambiguously 
includes Orlob, individually, as a party. Further, he has an 
individual interest in the Combined Agreement separate and 
distinct from PCG's interest. His interest arises from the personal 
covenants he made to assist with the orderly transfer and 
maintenance of accounts and not to compete with Wasatch and 
the Jensens. [FN3] 
FN3. We do not address what percentages of interest Orlob and 
PCG had in the Combined Agreement, nor do we address whether 
Orlob breached the Combined Agreement. 
fl 21 Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of Wasatch 
and the Jensen's motion for summary judgment. We reverse the 
district court's denial of Orlob's motion for partial summary 
judgment. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Id. ffll 19-21, 33 P.3d at 1082 (emphasis supplied). 
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On remand, the trial court held a trial on June 25, 26 and 27, 2002. Prior to 
entering its findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, the Jensens filed a post-
trial brief, raising new defenses for the first time. Orlob moved to strike such brief and, 
after hearing on the motion to strike, the trial court struck the Jensen's post-trial brief, 
took arguments on whether pre-judgment interest was awardable, and entered its 
finding of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, on February 10, 2004. A timely notice 
of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, was filed by the Jensens with the Third District 
Court, on March 9, 2004 and a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was 
filed by Orlob with the Third District Court on March 10, 2004. Both appeals were 
poured over to this Court for decision and this Court consolidated the appeals, and 
designated the Jensens as Appellants and Cross-Appellees, and Orlob as Cross-
Appellant and Appellee. 
C. Disposition By Trial Court. 
The trial court entered its final judgment on February 10, 2004, awarding Orlob 
damages in the sum of $340,162.10. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT1 
1. Plaintiff David L. Orlob ("Orlob"), in approximately 1978, started a 
physicians billing service known as Professional's Control Group. R. 1632. 
2. In December, 1984, Orlob incorporated Professional's Control Group as 
Professional's Control Group, Inc., a Utah corporation ("PCG"). R. 1632. 
3. Defendant Wasatch Medical Management was, at all material times, a 
1The following facts are taken from the like-numbered paragraphs in the trial 
court's findings of fact. R. 1631-49. 
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partnership consisting of defendants Kenneth C. Jensen, Earlene B. Jensen, Steven K. 
Jensen and Kevin J. Jensen (collectively, the "Jensens"). Prior to August 1, 1988, the 
Jensens operated a physician's billing service primarily in the Ogden area. R. 1632. 
4. During 1987 and the first part of 1988, the Jensens desired to enter the 
Salt Lake valley market to provide physician billing services. During that time, PCG 
provided service to between 30% and 35% of the anesthesiology market in the Salt 
Lake valley, as well as some physicians in Logan and some physicians in Payson, 
Utah. R. 1632. 
5. At that time, PCG provided those billing services to physicians at the rate 
of 6% of collections. R. 1632. 
6. When the Jensens attempted to enter the Salt Lake market, they 
contacted a variety of anesthesiologists, some of whom were clients of PCG, and 
offered billing services at 4%. Up until that time, the market for billing services had 
been relatively stable and PCG had not received complaints about its price for billing 
services. R. 1633. 
7. The Jensens' efforts led at least three of PCG's clients to leave PCG. R. 
1633. 
8. Orlob approached the Jensens, advised them that he was interested in 
selling PCG and leaving the Salt Lake City area, and inquired into their interest in 
purchasing PCG. The Jensens were adamant that they were not interested in 
purchasing the stock of PCG, because they did not want to assume any outstanding 
liabilities of that existing corporate entity. R. 1633. 
9. After negotiations, the parties agreed to a purchase and sale and 
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memorialized that agreement in a document titled "Combined Agreement," executed 
August 31, 1988 by the parties, and effective as of August 1, 1988 (the "Combined 
Agreement"). R. 1633. 
10. The Combined Agreement states: "For Orlob's assistance in the transfer 
and maintenance of accounts listed on Schedule 'B' Jensens shall pay to Orlob a 
commission that has been calculated at $7,500 per month." Combined Agreement, fl 8. 
R. 1633. 
11. The Combined Agreement also states: "Orlob further agrees and warrants 
he will not compete directly or indirectly in Utah against or adverse to Jensens in the 
billing and collection business for a period of ten years commencing August 1, 1988." 
Combined Agreement, Tf 6. R. 1633-34. 
12. "Orlob has an individual interest in the combined agreement, which is tied 
to his covenants to assist in the transfer and maintenance of accounts and not to 
compete." Orlob /, 2001 UT App. 287, U 19. R. 1634. 
13. At the time the Combined Agreement was executed, all of the physicians 
listed in Schedule "B" to the Combined Agreement were under contract with PCG to pay 
6% of total collections for services rendered. However, William M. Hamilton, M.D., one 
of the physicians on that list, had sent a letter, dated August 10, 1988, to Orlob and 
PCG providing notice of his termination of his contract as of December 1, 1988. All of 
the doctors listed on Schedule "B" were on contracts that allowed termination upon 
either 30 or 90 days' written notice. R. 1634. 
14. After execution of the Combined Agreement, Orlob advised PCG's 
employees that they would become employees of the Jensens. Orlob even specifically 
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dissuaded at least on valuable employee, who expressed an intention to terminate her 
employment when she learned the Jensens would be purchasing the company, from 
leaving. That employee remains with the Jensens to this day and has been a valuable 
asset to them, including training new employees. Orlob also took all necessary steps to 
place PCG's checking account under the Jensens' control and to transfer all files of 
PCG to the Jensens' control. Steven Jensen prepared a form 1099 to David L. Orlob 
for commission payments made in 1989. R. 1634. 
15. The Jensens repeatedly requested that Orlob introduce them to 
physicians as the new owners of the company. Orlob refused to do so, advising the 
Jensens that if doctors who previously had been offered billing at 4% by the Jensens 
learned that the Jensens were the new owners of the company, it would affect their 
willingness to continue on their contracts to pay 6%. The Jensens then advised at least 
one such doctor that they were the new owners of the company, which created the very 
reaction Orlob predicted, with the Salt Lake anesthesiologists threatening to terminate 
their contracts. Thereupon, the Jensens chose to negotiate reductions in the billing 
rates for those doctors from 6% to 5%. From that time forward, the relationship 
between the Jensens and David L. Orlob deteriorated, with each periodically 
threatening litigation against the other. R. 1635. 
16. The only evidence of Dr. Hamilton's average income per month is Exhibit 
5, which was prepared by the Jensens, showing an average income per month for 1988 
of $18,044.00. Because Dr. Hamilton had already sent a letter terminating his 6% 
contract at the time the Combined Agreement was executed, Orlob breached his 
warranty with respect to Dr. Hamilton. Ultimately, Dr. Hamilton did not terminate as his 
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letter stated he would, based upon the efforts of the Jensens to renegotiate his 
contract. According to Exhibit 3, which was prepared by the Jensens, there were no 
reductions for Dr. Hamilton until May, 1989, at which time Dr. Hamilton went from 6% to 
5%. 1 % of $18,044.00 per month is $180.44 per month. As of May, 1989, when Dr. 
Hamilton went from 6% to 5%, a reduction in the $7,500.00 per month Orlob 
commission of $180.44 per month is appropriate to remedy the breach of warranty for 
Dr. Hamilton. R. 1635-36. 
17. In or about February, 1990, according to Exhibit 9, Dr. Watson in Payson 
telephoned the Jensens and advised them that he would be switching his billing 
agencies, not in any way related to any performance problems but, instead, because of 
personal disagreements with Dr. Beaty which necessitated a restructuring of their 
organization. The Jensens took it upon themselves to negotiate with Dr. Watson and 
Dr. Beaty to form an employee leasing company and to reduce the amount at which 
they were willing to provide billing services to Dr. Beaty and Dr. Watson from 6% to 4%. 
Such circumstances are unrelated to any breach of the Combined Agreement by Orlob, 
R. 1636. 
18. With respect to the physicians listed on Schedule "B" of the Combined 
Agreement who terminated, and replacement doctors: 
a. Dr. Stockham terminated as of October, 1989, and, beginning with 
that date, a reduction in the Orlob commission of $210.54 is appropriate. Dr. 
Stockham testified that he returned after six months, however, and, therefore, no 
reduction is appropriate for Dr. Stockham after March of 1990. R. 1636. 
b. Dr. Crookston departed as of October, 1989, and a reduction of 
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$370.71 per month for Dr. Crookston is appropriate under the Combined 
Agreement. Dr. Christensen replaced Dr. Crookston in March, 1990, such that no 
reductions for Dr. Crookston are appropriate after February, 1990. R. 1636-37. 
c. Dr. Peterson departed as of November, 1989, and that a reduction 
of $396.64 per month in the Orlob commission is appropriate from and after 
November, 1989. R. 1637. 
d. Dr. Decker departed as of October, 1990, and that a reduction of 
$260.44 per month in the Orlob commission is appropriate from and after 
October, 1990. R. 1637. 
e. As of January, 1991, and thereafter, there were enough 
replacement physicians that, from and after January, 1991, there could be no 
allowed reductions to the Orlob commission payment under the Combined 
Agreement. R. 1637. 
19. Dr. Peterson departed from the Jensens services to have his billing 
performed by Tracey Hall, now known as Tracey Kartsone. Ms. Kartsone utilized 
equipment belonging to Mr. Orlob's new company, leased some space from Mr. Orlob 
and received consulting services from Orlob in conjunction with the billing services she 
provided to Dr. Peterson. Ms. Kartsone paid Mr. Orlob some sum of money for leasing 
and consulting, although the precise sum is in dispute. However, the precise sum is 
immaterial, because Orlob's knowledge of and assistance to Ms. Kartsone, and receipt 
of funds from her, established her as an agency for competition with the Jensens with 
respect to Dr. Peterson. As such, Orlob breached his personal covenant not to 
compete directly or indirectly with respect to Dr. Peterson. R. 1637-38. 
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20. On January 25, 1990, the Jensens issued a letter to Orlob stating that 
they were going to commence reducing the commission payment by $801.93, which 
they calculated as their monthly net profit from Dr. Peterson. The Jensens in fact made 
that deduction from the Orlob commission payment from that date forward and the 
Court finds that such resolution elected by the Jensens as the remedy for such breach 
was fair and appropriate. R. 1638. 
21. On or about October 1, 1990, the United States Department of the 
Treasury, Internal Revenue Service served a notice of levy upon the Jensens 
concerning taxes owing by PCG. The Jensens made no payment to Orlob, individually, 
for the commission payment due October 25, 1990, and no payment to Orlob, 
individually, thereafter. R. 1638. 
22. The Internal Revenue Service held a public auction on December 10, 
1990, at which it sold only the right, title and interest of PCG in and to the Combined 
Agreement. The Jensens were the successful bidder at that auction and purchased the 
PCG interest in the Combined Agreement. There was no levy upon any individual 
interest of David L. Orlob, at any time, by the Internal Revenue Service, nor did the 
public auction result in the sale of any of the interest of David L Orlob, individually, in 
the Combined Agreement. R. 1638. 
23. The Combined Agreement, itself, does not state whether or how the 
commission payment should be divided between PCG and David L. Orlob, individually. 
Absent any instruction in the Combined Agreement, the Court found that the 
commission payments go one-half, or 50%, to PCG and one-half, or 50%, to Orlob, 
individually. R. 1639. 
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24. The Schedule of Commission Payments attached to the Court's Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law as Exhibit A accurately reflects those commissions 
payable and paid, or portions paid or otherwise credited, such that the amounts owing, 
with interest, to Orlob for his 50% in the Combined Agreement would be the total shown 
on Exhibit A attached to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, or in other words, 
the sum of $340,162.10. R. 1639. 
ADDITIONAL FACTS 
25. Every commission check was written, on its face, to David L. Orlob, 
individually, and not to PCG. See Exhibit 47, Checks (admitted R. 1682, Tr. 28:20-
29:10). 
26. The Jensens issued an IRS form 1099 for commission payments to Orlob, 
individually, but not to PCG. R. 1685, Deposition Testimony of Steven K. Jensen, Tr. 
37:4-39-15. 
27. In all their correspondence to Orlob while the commission payments were 
being made, the Jensen's refer to them as Orlob's commission or "your" commission 
when the letter was addressed to Orlob. See Exhibits 7, 8, 9 and 32. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
At trial, no evidence was adduced to show that any of the funds paid under the 
terms of the Combined Agreement were paid to PCG. The only evidence presented 
was to the contrary. The parties to the Combined Agreement always treated the 
amounts owed under the Combined Agreement as amounts owed to Orlob; specifically, 
all checks issued were issued to Orlob, PCG had been administratively dissolved by the 
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State of Utah, was defunct for all intents and purposes. There is simply no evidence 
from which the trial court could have concluded that half of the amounts owing under 
the Combined Agreement belonged to PCG. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RULES OF CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION REQUIRED THE TRIAL COURT TO APPLY THE 
DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION TO DETERMINE WHO WAS ENTITLED TO 
RECEIVE THE COMMISSION PAYMENTS UNDER THE COMBINED AGREEMENT. 
The trial court, in Finding of Fact No.23, stated: 'The Combined Agreement, 
itself, does not state whether or how the commission payment should be divided 
between PCG and David L. Orlob, individually. Absent any instruction in the Combined 
Agreement, the Court found that the commission payments go one-half, or 50%, to 
PCG and one-half, or 50%, to Orlob, individually." This finding of fact was entered 
contrary to established rules of contract construction that must guide a court when a 
written instrument itself is ambiguously silent on the very issue that was before the trial 
court, namely, who is entitled to the monthly commission payments? 
The general rule of contract construction applicable in this case is the doctrine of 
practical construction, long recognized as capable of answering such questions by 
looking at the conduct of the parties, themselves, in discharging their contractual 
obligations: 
In the determination of the meaning of an indefinite or ambiguous 
contract, the construction placed upon the contract by the parties 
themselves is to be considered by the court. The practical 
construction or uniform conduct or practice of the parties under a 
contract is a consideration of much importance in ascertaining its 
meaning, and that consideration is entitled to great, if not 
controlling, weight in ascertaining the parties' understanding of the 
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contract terms and language, since the parties are in the best 
position to know what was intended by the language employed. 
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts, § 354 (1991)(footnotes omitted). This general principle is 
mirrored in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981): 
Where an agreement involves repeated occasions for performance 
by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance 
and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of 
performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given 
great weight in the interpretation of the agreement. 
Wherever reasonable, the manifestations of intention of the parties 
to a promise or agreement are interpreted as consistent with each 
other and with any relevant course of performance, course of 
dealing, or usage of trade. 
Id. § 202(4)-(5). 
The Utah courts long ago adopted the doctrine of practical construction under 
circumstances where the contract language itself is not plain. The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated: "When the parties to a contract perform under it and demonstrate by their 
conduct that they knew what they were talking about the courts should enforce their 
interest." Bullough v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 308, 400 P.2d 20, 23 (1965) (quoting 
Crestview Cemetery Ass'n v. Dieden, 54 Cal.2d 744, 8 Cal.Rptr. 427, 356 P.2d 171 
(1960)). Accord Eie v. St Benedicts Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (1981) (enforcing 
agreement in accordance with parties' conduct); Upland Industries Corp. v. Pacific 
Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1984) (court will enforce agreement in 
light of two and one half years of conduct of parties). 
In this case, the facts supporting a practical construction that Orlob, not PCG, 
was the intended recipient of the commission payments are compelling, yet were not 
used by the trial court to resolve its stated dilemma. First, this was intended to be, and 
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was, the sale of a business that Orlob had created and operated over the years, in part 
due to Orlob's desire to relocate at a point in the near future. See FOF fflj 1-8; R. 1632-
33. The only reason that the sale was not a stock sale was to accommodate the 
Jensen's desire not to assume PCG liabilities. See FOF fl 8; R. 1633. The bulk of the 
value in the Combined Agreement was contained in Orlob's personal covenants to 
assist in the orderly transfer of the business and his ten year non-compete agreement. 
See FOF ffl] 10-12; R. 1633-34; and Orlob /, 2001 UT App. 287 ffl| 19-21, 33 P.3d at 
1082. 
The Jensens submitted an IRS form 1099 to the IRS reporting commission 
payments to Orlob, personally, not to PCG. Every check written by the Jensens for 
commission payments was written to Orlob, personally, not to PCG. See Exhibit 47. 
The Jensens' correspondence reflects that they considered the commission payments 
to be "Orlob's." See Exhibits 7, 8, 9 and 32. PCG had no bank account in which to 
place any payments, PCG was entirely defunct and allowed to be administratively 
dissolved by the State of Utah. See Exhibit 40, R. 1681, Tr. 81:5-82:6. 
Rules of contract interpretation are applied as a matter of law. The doctrine of 
practical construction should have been used as the respected rule of contract 
interpretation it is, to resolve the trial court's expressed dilemma over the absence of 
express contract language. All the evidence of the conduct of the parties established 
that the commission payments were made by the Jensens to Orlob, the only contracting 
party in a position to receive them, and the doctrine of practical construction therefore 
would not allow for the arbitrary reduction of Orlob's judgment by 50%, for unpaid 
commission payments. This Court should reverse the arbitrary reduction of Orlob's 
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right to receive the commission payments by 50%, and apply the legal tool of the 
doctrine of practical construction to award all of the commission payments to Orlob, and 
none to PCG. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF FACT REDUCING ORLOB'S JUDGMENT BY 50% Is 
NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
As was shown in Point I, above, the trial court, in Finding of Fact No. 23, 
effectively conceded that it had no basis in fact to allocate 50% of the commission 
payments to PCG. Indeed, the Jensens themselves concede that no evidence exists in 
the record to allocate 50% of the commission payments to PCG, although they attempt 
to characterize the failure as being that no evidence supports Orlob getting 50%. See 
Appellants' Brief at 49 ("In this case, however, the Defendants have located no 
evidence in the record whatsoever supporting the District Court's finding. There is, 
literally, no evidence to marshall.") The Jensens are correct insofar as they concede 
that not one whit of evidence supports any portion of the commission payments under 
the Combined Agreement being allocated to PCG. There is, therefore, nothing to 
marshall on that front. 
Defendants have, however, utterly failed to marshall the evidence supporting the 
trial court's finding that Orlob is entitled to receive commission payments, some of 
which evidence is set forth above in Point I on the doctrine of practical construction. 
Since all of the evidence supporting a practical construction shows Orlob receiving the 
commission payments, and not PCG, and there is no evidence that PCG was to receive 
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any commission payments,2 the trial court's finding that takes away 50% of the 
commission payments from Orlob and gives it to PCG is clearly erroneous and is not 
supported by substantial evidence. The judgment entered should be ordered to be 
doubled, because all the evidence shows that Orlob, not PCG, was entitled to receive, 
and in fact received, the commission payments. 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
III. THE JENSENS' UNTIMELY DEFENSE BASED ON ORLOB'S BANKRUPTCY WAS 
CONSIDERED FULLY AND PROPERLY REJECTED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The Jensens sought to raise their "standing" (actually real party in interest) 
defense for the first time, after more than eight years, after the conclusion of one 
appeal to this Court, and after trial on the merits on remand, by way of a post-trial 
memorandum. R. 1484-99. Orlob moved to strike the memorandum and defenses it 
purported to raise. R. 1503-26. The trial court ruled in Orlob's favor, struck the 
memorandum and entered judgment in Orlob's favor, finding that the defenses sought 
were waivable and had been waived. 
2Nor is there any rational reason offered as to why Orlob might subject the 
payments to the double taxation they would receive if they were made to PCG. 
18 
A. THE JENSENS WAIVED THEIR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST DEFENSE, THAT THEY 
SEEK TO PURSUE BY MISLABELING IT AS A "STANDING" DEFENSE,3 BY NOT 
RAISING IT UNTIL AFTER TRIAL AND ALMOST TEN YEARS AFTER THEY 
ANSWERED. 
The Jensens' novel effort to raise, for the first time in ten years of litigation, and 
entirely post-trial, a defense based on Orlob's post-complaint bankruptcy filing is 
unsupported in the evidence, was found by the trial court to be waivable, and was 
stricken by the trial court as untimely raised. 
The Jensens' revisionist history on this issue is palpable. The Jensens argue 
that the evidence at trial showed, although the trial court failed to find, that Orlob's filing 
of a bankruptcy after he filed this action, without listing this action as an asset on his 
bankruptcy schedules, amounts to "concealment" and that the bankruptcy trustee's 
acquisition of legal title to the claim prohibits Orlob from pursuing it. 
In their memorandum opposing Orlob's motion to strike the Jensens' untimely 
new defenses raised in their post-trial memorandum, the Jensens argued: 'The reason 
that no relief may be granted in this case is that the Defendant violated his duty of 
disclosure on the bankruptcy schedules he filed in California!,]" Opp Mem at 3; R. 1539. 
When the Jensens argued the proffered relevancy of the bankruptcy schedules, in 
opposition to Orlob's motion in limine and prior to the commencement of trial, however, 
they asserted an entirely different theory of relevancy. In "Defendants' Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine Re: Bankruptcy Schedule," dated May 28, 2002 (R. 1401-
04), the Jensens did not argue about any "duty of disclosure" but instead represented 
3The law demonstrating that the Jensens' defense is a real party in interest 
defense, and not jurisdictional, is discussed below, in Part C. 
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to the trial court that the bankruptcy schedules would be offered by the Jensens "only to 
show that [Orlob's] view of the value of his interest in the Agreement was that it had no 
value. [Emphasis in original.]" Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine Re: 
Bankruptcy Schedule, dated May 28, 2002, at 3, R. 1403. In keeping with that very 
limited scope for which the bankruptcy schedule was offered, the Jensens' trial 
memorandum, dated June 20, 2002,4 contained none of the arguments concerning 
"standing" (in reality, real-party-in-interest) or judicial estoppel that the Jensens asserted 
for the first time in their supplemental post-trial memorandum. Instead, the Jensens' 
trial memorandum argued that the bankruptcy schedule showed "By [Orlob's] own 
admission, his interest in the Combined Agreement had little or no value" Defendants' 
trial memorandum, dated June 20, 2002, at 9 (Appendix 1) (emphasis added). The 
bankruptcy schedules were offered at trial for that limited purpose and received by the 
trial court strictly for that limited purpose. 
At no time in the ten years prior to trial did the Jensens ever raise the real party 
in interest defense that they unsuccessfully urged upon the trial court post-trial. This is 
true despite multiple opportunities to do so. The Jensens did not raise the defense in 
their answer. R. 62-67. 
A decade earlier, the Jensens argued the merits of the case fully in their 
memorandum in opposition to Orlob's motion for summary judgment and in support of a 
cross-motion for summary judgment, filed on or about December 6, 1993. R. 194-
4Defendants' Trial Memorandum is not listed on the record index. A date-
stamped copy is contained within the records of Orlob's counsel and is attached hereto 
as Appendix 1. 
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220A. However carefully the Court may scrutinize that memorandum, it will find no 
mention of any "duty to disclose" or, for that matter, any mention of bankruptcy 
whatsoever, despite the fact that, throughout that memorandum, the Jensens sought to 
defeat Orlob's claims. Nor is there any mention of bankruptcy or a "duty to disclose" in 
the April 18, 1994 trial memorandum filed by the Jensens. R. 328-343. Nor do those 
defenses appear in the Jensens' memorandum in support of motion for partial summary 
judgment [on Orlob's claims], dated September 7, 1999. R. 421-549. Nor do they 
appear in the Jensens' response to Orlob's motion for partial summary judgment on 
Orlob's claims, dated February 22, 2000. R. 701-705. Nor did the Jensens raise the 
issue in their brief to the Utah Court of Appeals on the prior appeal, in which they 
argued all their existing defenses against liability. Nor did the Jensens raise these 
issues at any time during the course of the trial itself or during closing arguments, even 
after the trial court invited supplementation of the issues the trial court desired to have 
argued orally. R. 1683, Tr. 40:7-18. 
Instead, it was only after trial, for the first time, that the Jensens raised this 
concept of "duty to disclose" on the bankruptcy schedules for any defense of "standing" 
which is really a real-party-in-interest defense,5 or "judicial estoppel." But no evidence 
was received at trial on those issues, because the bankruptcy evidence was offered 
and received for the narrow purpose of showing that Orlob himself did not believe that 
the Combined Agreement had any value to him, an argument that the trial court 
5The Jensens in that post-trial memorandum also sought to raise for the first time 
the defense of judicial estoppel, which effort was also rejected by the trial court. 
Appendix 2. 
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rejected by virtue of its findings. The case of Keller v. Southwood North Medical 
Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998), is therefore dispositive and the trial court 
properly struck the defense as untimely and entered judgment. 
B. "STANDING TO SUE" AND "REAL PARTY IN INTEREST" ARE DISTINCT 
CONCEPTS AND THE "REAL PARTY IN INTEREST"DEFENSE CAN BE, AND HAS 
BEEN, WAIVED. 
The Jensens are aware that the trial court ruled that their late effort to raise new 
defenses would not be allowed because their failure to raise the defenses timely 
resulted in a waiver. They therefore seek to mislabel their waived, real party in 
interest defense, as a "standing" defense, because true "standing to sue" is 
jurisdictional in nature, and cannot be waived. 
Controlling Utah precedent and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure establish that 
this is not a jurisdictional issue of standing, but rather, one of a defect in parties or real 
party in interest that defendants have waived.6 By asserting that it is the bankruptcy 
6The Jensens may hold out hope for success in their argument, perhaps, 
because many courts make the mistake of confusing real party in interest issues as 
"standing to sue," when they are not. See Charles Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller & 
Edward H. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3531, at 341-45 & n. 8 (1984) 
("At times courts are tempted to draw from standing decisions in addressing such 
matters as the existence of a cause of action, identification of the real party in interest, 
capacity, intervention, and even the procedural rights of bankrupts."). In Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Bachman, 894 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1990), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained why it is important to distinguish 
between the very different concepts of standing and real party in interest: 
The term "standing," however, is used loosely in many contexts to 
denote the party with a right to bring a particular cause of action. 
This practice leads to much confusion when it is necessary to 
distinguish between "standing" in its most technical sense and the 
concept of real party in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). . . . 
Using the term "standing" to designate real-party-in-interest issues 
(continued...) 
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trustee, rather than Orlob, who owns the cause of action in this case, the Jensens are 
asserting that this action is not "prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 17(a). That defense is required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
be asserted in a responsive pleading. Specifically, UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b) states: "Every 
defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if 
one is required. . . ." UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b). The Jensens filed such a responsive 
pleading but failed to raise the defense that Orlob was not the real party in interest to 
pursue this lawsuit in their answer, the Jensens waived the defense. See, e.g., UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 12(h). 
In Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496 (Utah 1976), "[pjlaintiff sued to recover a sum 
he claimed under an agreement with defendant." Id. at 496. The defendant was listed 
as an individual, operating under an assumed name of Lynn S. Porter House Movers, 
Inc. See id. The case proceeded through trial and a judgment was entered in favor of 
the plaintiff and against the defendant, individually. See id. The Utah Supreme Court 
6(...continued) 
tempts courts to apply standing principles outside the context in 
which they were developed. The instant case illustrates the 
problems that can result. Defendants are correct that standing may 
implicate the Article III requirement of a "case or controversy" and 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction which cannot be waived. 
However, failure to timely raise a real-party-in-interest defense 
operates as a waiver. [Citations omitted.] Even if standing 
jurisprudence is helpful by analogy in resolving real-party-in-
interest issues, this does not convert real party in interest into 
a non-waivable issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Id. at 1235-36 (emphasis added). 
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held than an individual defendant's failure to object to a defect in parties (claiming that a 
corporate defendant should have been named rather than the individual) which was not 
raised timely, was waived "as provided in Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P." Id. at 496. That case, 
decided expressly under Rule 12(h), is in accord with the long-standing law in the state 
of Utah. 
In Smith v. Royer, 26 Utah 2d 83, 485 P.2d 664 (1971), the Court held that, 
where the plaintiffs "standing as the real party in interest in the replevin action was not 
raised below, . . . it was waived." 26 Utah 2d at 87, 485 P.2d at 666-67. Indeed, the 
controlling law in Utah has been settled for over 100 years. In Fritz v. The Western 
Union Telegraph Company, 25 Utah 263, 71 P. 209 (1903), the Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that an objection made at trial on real party in interest grounds "was urged too 
late, and must be held to have been waived." 25 Utah at 280, 71 P. at 214. This 100 
year old law establishes that the real party in interest defense is not jurisdictionally-
based, but rather it is waivable. The Lewis decision establishes that such rule remains 
the same under UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(h). See Lewis, 556 P.2dat496. 
Here, despite having knowledge of Orlob's bankruptcy filing for more than eight 
years, the Jensens chose not to seek to amend their pleadings to assert a real party in 
interest defense, but rather, to sit back and wait and make a strategic judgment to 
assert such defense only after they might lose on their other defenses, attempting to 
couch it in the guise of jurisdiction. The law that controls this defense does not allow 
such gamesmanship. The trial court was correct to strike the supplemental trial 
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memorandum purporting to raise the defense.7 
C. THE FEDERAL LAW CITED BY THE JENSENS DOES NOT STAND FOR THE 
PROPOSITION THAT A "REAL PARTY IN INTEREST" DEFENSE Is 
JURISDICTIONAL. 
The Jensens desire to divert attention from the controlling Utah law, and to focus 
on federal cases they contend support their entitlement to raise their defense, for the 
first time, eight years after they filed their answer, and after trial concluded. The 
Jensens rely primarily on the case of Stein v. United Artists Corp., 691 F.2d 885 (9th 
Cir. 1982), and its progeny, for the proposition that Orlob may not pursue his lawsuit 
because it was not listed as an asset in his bankruptcy schedules.8 The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled that the Steins, individually, "have no standing as creditors or 
guarantors of Century," id. at 895, to assert Century's anti-trust claims that had not 
been listed on its bankruptcy schedules. The rationale for that ruling was that the 
"competitive injury" is to the corporation. See id. at 896. The issue of whether Stein 
could pursue an antitrust claim as an assignee of Century, the bankrupt, was resolved 
because Century did not own the claim to assign to Stein in the first place, the 
bankruptcy trustee did. See id. at 889 ("The court held that Century's failure to list the 
antitrust claim in the Chapter XI proceedings prevented the asset from vesting in 
7See also UTAH R. CIV. P. 25(c), authorizing a trial court to allow an original 
plaintiff to continue an action even where its interest has been transferred. 
8
 It is important to note that, in Stein, the debtor had filed for bankruptcy on 
October 11, 1976, see id. at 888, prior to the anti-trust case being filed in June, 1979, 
see id. at 889. The plaintiff, Stein, sought to proceed with the lawsuit "as assignee" of 
the bankruptcy debtor, Century on a post-bankruptcy assignment. See id. at 889. 
Here, Orlob was the party directly injured by the Jensens' breach and he had already 
filed suit before bankruptcy. 
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Century at the conclusion of the Chapter XI proceedings. Hence Century could assign 
no claim."). Thus, the true holding in Stein was that there was no valid original 
assignment from the bankrupt debtor to the individuals seeking to assert an assigned 
claim in the litigation. 
That a jurisdictional issue of standing is not implicated here is demonstrated by a 
more recent Ninth Circuit case explaining Stein. In Pershing Park Villas Homeowners 
Association v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 219 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2000), the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that claims that had not been listed on bankruptcy 
schedules could be pursued by the bankrupt developers where an objection had not 
been timely raised. The defendants in that case, relying on Stein, objected to the 
developers' standing "on the rule that the bankruptcy estate retains title to pre-
bankruptcy causes of action not disclosed to or abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee." 
Id. at 899.9 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the idea that there was no 
standing to sue in the jurisdictional sense, stating: 
There can be no question that these injuries are concrete, traceable to 
Reliance's conduct, and remediable by money damages. Nor can there 
be any question that these injuries were literally "suffered by" the 
developers, see id., though the right to sue on them may have passed to 
their bankruptcy estates by operation of the bankruptcy laws. . . . Reliance 
claims that lack of title to their claims deprives the developers of 
9The cases of Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 159 B.R. 890 (9th Cir. BAP 1993), 
Stanley v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 B.R. 25 (W.D. Va. 1993), In re Benefield, 102 
B.R. 157 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1989) and Robinson v. J A. Wiertel Construction, 185 
A.D.2d 664, 586 N.Y.S.2d 59 (App. Div. 1992), cited by the Jensens, all recite this basic 
proposition of bankruptcy law. That this is a truism of bankruptcy law does not, 
however, transform a real party in interest defense, that arises under that set of facts, 
into a jurisdictional "standing to sue" defense, as is described more fully in the Pershing 
Park discussion, below. The cases cited by the Jensens do not even address whether 
the real-party-in-interest defense is waivable. 
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constitutional standing to sue. Yet we have specifically distinguished 
between constitutional standing and "third-party" standing to bring a claim 
to which another holds title. 
Id. at 900. Here, Orlob is a party to the very contract the Jensens breached, as were 
the plaintiffs in Pershing Park. 
Other language from the Ninth Circuit is also instructive. For example, the Ninth 
Circuit quoted the district court ruling: 
I think the question [ ] posed by an issue of standing is whether a 
party has a substantial [stake in a] controversy to make a justiciable 
matter. I think it is clear that the three individual plaintiffs do have a 
significant stake in the controversy. 
The issue [respecting title to the claim] may be one of the 
capacity to sue rather than standing. . . . And I think under all the 
circumstances that have been adduced in this trial, the objections 
by the defendants to [plaintiffs'] proceeding with this litigation [have] 
been waived. 
Id. at 900. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then held: 
The district court was entitled to conclude that the time and manner 
in which Reliance raised the issue of standing was strategic. We 
cannot say that the district court clearly erred in excluding any non-
jurisdictional issues of standing not designated for trial in the 
pretrial order. 
Id. at 900. Thus distinguishing between jurisdictional issues of "standing" and 
prudential issues of "standing" which, in Pershing Park, the trial court had identified as 
"capacity to sue,"10 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held essentially that issues of 
10
 In an earlier case, the Ninth Circuit had recognized this precise issue as a real 
party in interest issue. In United States ex rei Dennie Reed v. C.E. Callahan, 884 F.2d 
1180, 1183 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1989), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
expressly recognized that the issue of whether a debtor or the debtor's Chapter 7 
trustee had the right to sue was a question of real party in interest that was waivable. 
Id. (Party waived real party in interest objection that Chapter 7 trustee was the only 
(continued...) 
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parties are waivable and had been waived. Therefore, the holding of Stein, 
distinguished by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pershing Park, does not stand for 
the proposition that Orlob may not continue his lawsuit here. Instead, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has made clear that, even though a bankruptcy 
estate may hold title to a claim pursued by a party to a contract, that is a defense that is 
waivable. 
Here, the defense clearly has been waived, as the trial court held. The Jensens 
have known about Orlob's bankruptcy filing since before they took his deposition on 
March 17, 1994, well over ten years ago. The Jensens' counsel specifically questioned 
Orlob about his bankruptcy: 
Q. Have you ever filed bankruptcy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you file bankruptcy? 
A. I believe it was May of'92. 
R. 1684, Orlob Deposition at 38:11-14. The Jensens' counsel then specifically 
questioned about whether this lawsuit was listed on the bankruptcy schedules: 
Q. Did you disclose in the statements and schedules that you had 
a potential action pending with regard to this case? 
A. I don't recall. 
R. 1684, Orlob Deposition at 39:22-25. Thus, the Jensens knew about this issue for 
more than eight years prior to trial, yet chose not to raise it until after the conclusion of 
10(...continued) 
person with right to sue as the real party by failing to raise it in a timely manner.) 
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closing arguments following trial,11 and the trial court's ruling adverse to them. 
Instead, during that entire eight year period, the Jensens chose to take a 
different position, namely, that Orlob in fact had no interest in the combined agreement, 
at all. It is only after they have failed in that assertion at trial that they now, for strategic 
advantage, attempt to take the position that Orlob cannot pursue the interest that he 
has been found to have, based on a failure to list an asset that defendants have known 
about, or had the opportunity to know about, for more than eight years. This apparently 
strategic decision on the Jensens' part was properly found by the trial court to have 
resulted in a waiver for its untimely assertion. 
This is particularly true when the Jensens allowed the litigation to proceed, 
invoking the time and energies of the trial court, this Court on the first appeal, and now 
again, and of Orlob and his counsel in defending against their ultimately unsuccessful 
position, only to attempt to change it after seeing that they did not prevail. Moreover, 
the Jensens are not arguing that they should pay what they owe to the bankruptcy 
trustee, but rather, that they should not have to complete paying for the physicians' 
billing service they purchased and continue to operate profitably to this day. Viewed in 
that light, there is little equitable appeal to the Jensens' effort to avoid payment. 
D. THIS COURT UNQUESTIONABLY HAS JURISDICTION. 
It is unquestionable that David L. Orlob had standing to sue at the time he filed 
the initial complaint herein, in January, 1992, prior to the date of his bankruptcy. This 
11
 Indeed, the trial court invited counsel to add issues for closing argument that 
were not on the trial court's suggested issues for closing, yet the Jensens still held off 
raising this issue until after the trial court ruled adversely to them. R. 1683, Tr. 40:7-18. 
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Court's jurisdiction over the case is determined as of that time. "Standing is determined 
at the time suit is filed in the trial court, and subsequent events do not deprive the court 
of subject matter jurisdiction." Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control 
Board, 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 n.9 (Tex. 1993).12 
Orlob was and is an actual party to the Combined Agreement and its breach by 
the Jensens injured him. Even if the bankruptcy estate had pursued these claims, the 
residual left after payment to creditors and of the expenses of the estate would revert to 
Orlob. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6) (requiring distribution of remaining estate to debtor). 
See also 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, fl 726.02[6] n. 43 ("For this reason, the debtor has 
standing to participate in litigation that may result in a surplus."). Orlob thus, under all 
circumstances, even if the bankruptcy were re-opened, retains a very real interest in the 
pursuit of the claim, is injured by the Jensens' non-payment and has standing. 
Further, this case is the same as Pershing Park, in which the Ninth Circuit Court 
12
 Accord Get Set Organization v. Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, 446 Pa. 
174, 181, 286 A.2d633, 636 n. 6 (1971) ("[0]nce the jurisdiction of a court attaches, it 
exists for all times until the cause is fully and completely determined. . . . As a general 
rule, jurisdiction once acquired is not defeated by subsequent events, even though they 
are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first 
instance."); Cleveland Branch, National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 538 (6th Cir. 2001) ("We join the First, Fifth, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, which have all explicitly held that standing is 
determined as of the time the complaint is filed."). See also Euclid-Mississippi v. 
Western Casualty & Surety Company, Inc., 249 Miss. 547, 554, 163 So.2d 676, 679 
(1964) ("Jurisdiction is determined as of the time of filing suit."); Mansurv. Coffin, 54 
Me. 314, 317 (1866) ('The jurisdiction is determined by the facts existing at the time 
when the action was commenced."); State ex rel. Cowan v. District Court of First 
Judicial District, 131 Mont. 502, 508, 312 P.2d 119, 123 (1957) ("Jurisdiction however is 
to be determined as of the time the action was commenced. 21 C.J.S. Courts, Section 
112, page 171."); Bell v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 198 Wis.2d 347, 362, 541 
N.W.2d 824, 830 (Ct. App. 1995) ("[W]e determine jurisdiction as of the time an action 
is commenced. . . ."). 
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of Appeals found that the contracting parties had standing to sue because they, not the 
bankruptcy trustee, had "suffered" the breach, even though the bankruptcy trustee 
owned the claim. See 219 F.3d at 900. 
E. THE JENSENS' EFFORT TO RECAST THEIR STRICKEN, UNTIMELY, JUDICIAL 
ESTOPPEL DEFENSE DOES NOT AVAIL THEM. 
The Jensens argue in the "standing" portion of their Brief, that Orlob engaged in 
willful misconduct involving the courts by not listing this lawsuit as an asset. First, there 
is no evidence in the record that the omission was willful. The trial court did not make 
such a finding and the bankruptcy evidence admitted was not admitted for any such 
purpose. Second, however, this confusing portion of the Jensens' Brief is apparently 
designed to convince this Court that Orlob should be estopped from pursuing his claim, 
which argument is the untimely-raised "judicial estoppel" defense the trial court struck. 
The defense of judicial estoppel was waived, and is in any event inapplicable, as 
discussed below. 
This judicial estoppel defense, like the real party in interest defense, was raised 
for the first time, post-trial and, like the real party in interest defense, was stricken by 
the trial court as untimely raised.13 Apparently recognizing that they cannot prevail on 
13The Jensens may not call their judicial estoppel defense by its real name in 
their brief because they clearly cannot make out a judicial estoppel under Utah law. In 
Salt Lake City v. Silverfork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, 5 P.3d 1206, the Utah Supreme 
Court made clear that, in the Utah courts, judicial estoppel will not be used against a 
party where there is no evidence that the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought 
knowingly misrepresented any facts in a prior proceeding. See 2000 UT 3 H 33, 5 P.3d 
at 1217, n.15 ("The purpose behind judicial estoppel is not served in a case such as 
this, where there is no evidence that the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought 
knowingly misrepresented any facts in the prior proceeding."). Further, judicial estoppel 
will not be applied in Utah "where the party seeking to invoke judicial estoppel had 
(continued...) 
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appeal unless they convince this Court that their defense is jurisdictional, but hoping to 
use their argument of "concealment" to smear Orlob nonetheless, the Jensens continue 
to assert that Orlob's failure to list them was deliberate. 
First, there is no testimony or other evidence introduced at trial to that effect. 
The testimony of Orlob was that he had two brief meetings at a bankruptcy mill and 
signed the schedules they prepared. R. 1682, Tr. 126:4-14. A review of the schedules, 
themselves, which were not admitted for the purpose of showing any "concealment," 
shows that Orlob, in addition to not listing his claim against the Jensens, also did not 
list, although he could have obtained a discharge of them if they were listed, the 
Jensens' claims against Orlob for breach of contract. This failure by Orlob to list a debt 
that could have been discharged suggests that the failure to list the claim, both of which 
involved the Jensens, was mere inadvertence. The Jensens were not parties to the 
bankruptcy proceeding and were in no way prejudiced by the inadvertent oversight of 
Orlob, one that benefitted them because their claim against him was not discharged. 
13(...continued) 
equal or better access to the relevant facts." Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough v. 
Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Utah 1996). It is also required, under Utah law, that the 
party seeking to invoke judicial estoppel was a party to the prior proceeding, and that 
the party against whom judicial estoppel is invoked must have prevailed upon its 
statement against the party seeking to invoke judicial estoppel, in the prior proceeding. 
See Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996) ("[T]he rule followed in 
Utah requires that the party seeking judicial relief must have prevailed upon its 
statement in the earlier proceeding: '[A] person may not, to the prejudice of another 
person deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same persons 
or their privies involving the same subject-matter, if such prior position was successfully 
maintained.'"). In other words, Utah law requires reliance by the party seeking to invoke 
judicial estoppel. See, e.g., Schaerv. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1341 n.3 (Utah 1983) ("the 
absence of any reliance renders the doctrine of judicial estoppel or estoppel by oath 
inapplicable to the present case."). No evidence was introduced by the Jensens to 
uphold a finding on any of these elements. 
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Still, the Jensens cite Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 
414 (3d Cir. 1988), for the proposition that a "duty to disclose" somehow precludes 
Orlob from having standing in a jurisdictional sense. In Oneida, however, judicial 
estoppel was imposed against a Chapter 11 debtor. The more recent Third Circuit case 
of Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996) 
points out, in Oneida, the debtor had listed the persons in defendants' position here as 
creditors, without any mention of possible offset, and that is why judicial estoppel was 
imposed. See Ryan Operations G.P., 81 F.3d at 363 (Oneida judicially estopped 
because amount owed to creditor as liability listed, but claim against that creditor for 
possible offset omitted). 
Oneida pointed out that "the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply 'when 
the prior position was taken because of a good faith mistake rather than as part of a 
scheme to mislead the court.'" Id. at 362. Here, as noted, the Jensens' affirmative 
claims against Orlob were also inadvertently omitted, although defendants had sent 
Orlob a letter threatening to sue him. That is far different from Oneida. There was no 
evidence introduced of any willful misconduct on Orlob's part and the trial court entered 
no such finding, but instead struck their defense. Below, the Jensens also relied on 
Browning Manufacturing v. Mims (In re Coastal Planes, Inc.), 179 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 
1999). But even in Browning Manufacturing, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized that the omission of an asset from bankruptcy schedules must be coupled 
with affirmative evidence of bad faith. See id. at 211-12. Judicial estoppel was applied 
in Browning Manufacturing because there was affirmative evidence showing both that 
Coastal knew of the facts giving rise to its inconsistent position and that Coastal had a 
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motive to conceal its claims. See id. at 212. Here, the Jensens introduced no evidence 
of any kind to suggest that Orlob knowingly sought to conceal his claim against them 
and this defense was, in any event, properly stricken by the trial court as untimely. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The Jensens attempted to argue that the Combined Agreement had been 
subject to an oral modification. Although they argue that the "fact that the parties 
reached an understanding that payments to [Orlob] would be reduced proportionately is 
soundly supported in the record[,]" Opening Brief at 24-25, the fact is that Orlob denied 
such a modification in his testimony. R. 1681, Tr. 78:6-19. UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-
4(1 )(a) states: 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some 
note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the 
party to be charged with the agreement: (a) every agreement that 
by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making 
of the agreement. . .." 
Id. The Combined Agreement clearly falls within the terms of the statute of frauds, 
because it "by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making of the 
agreement." Indeed, the Combined Agreement contains a ten-year non-compete 
provision14 and defined the "commission period" as commencing "October 1, 1988 and 
terminating] July 31,1994." Combined Agreement, at 2-3. "The rule is well settled in 
Utah that if an original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent 
agreement which modifies the original written agreement must also satisfy the 
14See Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 
1984) (oral non-compete agreement extending past one year void under statute of 
frauds). 
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requirements of the statute of frauds to be enforceable." Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. 
Manias, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985). Since the Jensens introduced no written 
modification signed by Orlob, and Orlob denied any agreement to modify on the witness 
stand, the statute of frauds controlled the trial court's decision, and no enforceable 
modification had been proved. As to the testimony to which the Jensens refer, the trial 
court, by not making a finding that there was sufficient evidence to take the alleged 
modification out of the statute of frauds, and by applying the statute of frauds, 
necessarily concluded that the Jensens' proffered evidence was insufficient to convince 
the trial court otherwise. 
The Jensens point to Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App. 245, 988 P.2d 1, and 
contend that it refutes the propriety of the application of the statute of frauds in this 
case. The Jensens simply misread Pasquin. In Pasquin, the enforceability of an oral 
employment agreement was involved. See id. ffij 3,6,10, 988 P.2d at 2-4. The term of 
the alleged oral employment contract was for the employee's "lifetime." See id. This 
Court recognized that such term, by its nature indefinite, could be performed within one 
year if the employee died. Id. fl 18, 988 P.2d at 6. The Combined Agreement here, in 
contrast, by its terms requires payments to extend for a period over one year and 
requires performance on a covenant not to compete for ten years. Those terms are not 
indefinite and expressly require performance beyond a period of one year. Likewise, in 
lion's Service Corp. v. Danielson, 12 Utah 2d 369, 366 P.2d 982 (1961), relied on by 
the Jensens, the term of a contract between a member and a corporation was indefinite 
and subject to termination at any time. Id., 12 Utah 2d at 372, 366 P.2d at 984-85. 
This is entirely unlike the situation here, where the Combined Agreement expressly 
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requires performance to occur over a period that extends beyond one year. Since the 
Combined Agreement is within the statute of frauds, so is the alleged modification. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE BREACHES BY ORLOB DID NOT VITIATE THE 
JENSENS' PAYMENT OBLIGATION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The Jensens argue that the trial court "made no express factual findings with 
respect to whether [Orlob's] breaches of the [Combined Agreement] either were or were 
not material." Opening Brief at 28. This ignores the express findings of fact by the trial 
court concerning thebreaches. FOF fl 16 expressly discusses Orlob's breach of 
warranty to deliver Dr. Hamilton at a 6% commission, and makes a finding as to the 
appropriate remedy for that breach, under the circumstances. FOF fl 17 expressly 
discusses Doctors Watson and Beatty and their renegotiation of their commission 
payment from 6% to 4%, expressly finding that such renegotiation and reduction was 
completely unrelated to any breach by Orlob. Finally, the trial court, on finding that 
Orlob breached his covenant not to compete with respect to one physician, Dr. 
Peterson, found in FOF fl 20, that the Jensens had gone forward with the contract and 
elected a remedy to deal with that situation that was fair and appropriate. 
The Hamilton and Peterson situations were the only express findings of breach 
where there was any finding of adverse economic impact to the Jensens under the 
Combined Agreement. In each of those situations, based on the facts, the trial court 
imposed an appropriate remedy to compensate the Jensens. The Jensens have failed 
to attack the sufficiency of the trial court's findings listed above. They have failed to 
make any effort to marshall the evidence in favor of those findings and then attempt to 
show that the findings are unsupported by any substantial evidence. Based on that 
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failure alone, this Court should refuse to review the Jensens' third point of appeal, as to 
whether they should have been excused from any further payment obligation, because 
it must be assumed that substantial evidence supports the findings. See 438 Main 
Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,^69, 99 P.3d 801, 817. 
The Jensens apparently attempt to avoid the marshalling requirement by arguing 
that "materiality" is a question of law, not fact. In support of that argument, they cite 
three cases, Hermansen v. Tasulas, 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 235, Gohlerv. Wood, 919 
P.2d 561 (Utah 1996) and S & F Supply Co. v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (Utah 1974). The 
"materiality" discussed in each of these cases is not whether a particular breach of 
contract was a material breach of contract, but rather, whether certain facts, either 
omitted or misrepresented, were "material" in a fraud context. Each of those cases 
supports a conclusion that the "materiality" component of a representation or omission 
in a fraud case is essentially objective, and therefore a legal question. This is not a 
fraud case. 
The controlling law that answers the question of whether a breach of contract is 
so material as to justify relieving the non-breaching party of further performance 
obligations is Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
In Coalville City, an outdoor sign company contended that the City had breached 
its agreement by not purchasing or leasing a sign and that the company therefore was 
relieved of its obligation under the agreement to remove its billboards over an eighteen 
year period. See id. at 1207-08. The trial court held, based on the facts, that the 
breach was not material. This Court cited the following authorities that the 
determination of materiality of a breach of contract is a question of fact): 
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'The law is well settled that a material breach by one party to a 
contract excuses further performance by the non-breaching party." 
Holbrookv. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah 
App.1994). What constitutes a material breach is a question of 
fact. Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug 
Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 458 (Utah App.1994) ("Whether a party 
has materially breached a lease is generally a question of fact for 
the fact finder."), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995 . . .. 
Coalville City, 930 P.2d at 1209. This ruling is also supported by the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 241 (1981), which lists the factual considerations that a 
court must look at to resolve the fact question of whether a breach of contract is 
material. One consideration expressly listed is whether the injured party could be 
adequately compensated, see id. § 241 (b), a consideration that the trial court's findings 
resolved by determining adequate compensation to the Jensens. Another express 
consideration is the extent to which the party failing to perform will suffer forfeiture. See 
id. § 241(c). Here, the Jensens argue that they should be relieved of their obligation to 
pay for an entire business, due to breaches that are easily remedied as the trial court 
did. The Jensens simply argued for a forfeiture that the trial court would not allow. 
Thus, substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings and decision. The 
Jensens' failure to marshall such evidence, and choice to offer evidence supporting 
only their argument, cannot be excused. The trial court heard all the evidence and 
ruled based upon substantial evidence. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST. 
Again, the Jensens fail to marshall evidence to support the trial court's finding on 
pre-judgment interest, as set forth in the exhibit attached to and incorporated in its 
findings of fact. R. 1644-49. The calculation of pre-judgment interest in this case is 
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pure math. 
If there were no claims of offset in this case, interest on each unpaid monthly 
commission sums owing under the Combined Agreement would be made by adding 
interest to each monthly commission payment as it became due and remained unpaid. 
This is a general principle of law, allowing prejudgment interest as a consequential 
damage: 
Prejudgment interest is allowed on the theory that an injured 
party should be fully compensated for his or her loss, and is 
appropriate when the underlying recovery is compensatory in 
nature and when the amount at issue is easily ascertainable and 
one upon which interest can be easily computed. 
45 AM. JUR. 2D Interest and Usury § 42 (1999). Utah law is in accord with this standard 
for awarding prejudgment interest: 
"A prejudgment interest award is proper when the damage is 
complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the 
amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time." Lefavi v. Bertoch, 
2000 UT App 5, ^24, 994 P.2d 817 (quotations and citations 
omitted). "[A] court may only award prejudgment interest if 
damages are calculable within a mathematical certainty." Id. 
Harris v. IES Associates, Inc., 2003 UT App 112, fl 52, 69 P.3d 297, 311. In Harris, like 
here, the defendant argued that no prejudgment interest could be awarded because of 
its entitlement to offsets. See id., fl 53. This Court rejected that argument, stating that 
"Utah appellate courts have recognized that 'offsets should be deducted before interest 
is calculated when an interest bearing award arises at the same time as the offsets.'" Id. 
(quoting Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 381 (Utah 1996)). The 
test is whether Orlob's damages can be calculated with mathematical certainty, a test 
that has been defined by the Utah courts: 
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For damages to be calculable with mathematical certainty, they 
must be ascertained "in accordance with fixed rules of evidence 
and known standards of value, which the court or jury must follow 
in fixing the amount rather than be guided by their best judgment in 
assessing the amount to be allowed for past as well as for future 
injury, or for elements that cannot be measured by any fixed 
standards of value." Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & 
Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Fell 
v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1007 (1907)). 
Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App 5, fl 24, 994 P.2d 817, 823.15 
In this case, each offset is specific to a particular monthly commission payment. 
Each monthly commission payment is mathematically certain, and each monthly offset 
has been declared by the Court and is mathematically certain. Exhibit "A" to the 
proposed findings, R. 1644-49, specifically accounts for the offsets in the fashion 
required by the Utah courts, i.e., before the calculation of interest. Any ruling that Orlob 
may not have interest that is easily calculable simply give defendants a windfall use of 
the money they should have paid, but did not, for over a decade, and would constitute 
an unjust enrichment. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE 6% WARRANTY WAS A WARRANTY OF THE 
DELIVERED CONTRACTS Is SUPPORTED BY THE LANGUAGE OF THE COMBINED 
AGREEMENT AND THE TESTIMONY. 
The language of the Combined Agreement states: "Notwithstanding the 
15The Jensens' contention that the assessment of respective interests between 
Orlob and PCG would defeat Orlob's right to prejudgment interest also has previously 
been rejected by the Utah courts. In Lefavi, the trial court was unable to calculate the 
percentage interest of plaintiff in an investment, which had been disputed, until the 
parties'entered astipulation. 2000 UT App 5, fflj 9-13, 994 P.2d at 820-21. The Court 
of Appeals found that the "damages in this case were complete, the loss was measured 
by facts and figures, and the loss was fixed at the time of each sale[,]" id. f[ 27, 994 
P.2d at 823, and rejected the argument against prejudgment interest as "unpersuasive." 
Id. 1126. 
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foregoing, Orlob warrants that all listed [] anesthesiologists accounts must be willing to 
pay 6% of total collections for services rendered " The trial court took testimony on the 
meaning of this ambiguous provision Orlob testified that each doctor was delivered 
under a contract by which the doctor was required to pay 6%, although Hamilton had 
sent a letter before Orlob completed his deal with the Jensens, indicating that Hamilton 
was unwilling to continue at 6%and threatening to terminate his contract (at a time after 
closing with the Jensens) 
Steve testified that it was the Jensens' "hope" that the warranty was for the life of 
the contract, even though most of the doctors could terminate on 90 days notice R 
1682, Tr 54 11-55 14 The trial court took argument on the issue on the second day of 
trial R 1682, Tr 133 21-153 11 Following that argument, the trial court entered its 
findings of fact on the record R 1682, Tr 153 12-157 8 As part of those findings, the 
trial court expressly found "So I find it not credible that the Jensens were to suggest, 
first of all, that the meaning of this warranty was that, for the entire course of this 
contract that, what Mr Orlob, what Mr Orlob was offering, was that these doctors would 
not deviate from six percent and secondly, that he had agreed to go around and 
introduce them as new owners of the business and expect that the doctors would stick 
with the six percent" R 1682, Tr 155 17-23 
The trial court recited an abundance of evidence that supported that finding The 
Jensens made no effort to marshall that evidence in attacking the trial court's finding, 
incorrectly arguing instead "The Court did not base its ruling on any finding as to the 
intention of the parties based upon the Combined Agreement or any other factors in 
evidence at trial" Opening Brief at 40 What is most astounding about the Jensens' 
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contention in their brief is that they actually quote a snippet from the trial judge's 
findings, but ignore everything else the judge said. 
Instead of marshalling the evidence that the trial court relied on, they 
characterize evidence that they deem favorable to them, characterizations the trial 
judge already rejected after hearing the evidence. The fact that the Jensens plow 
through facts they consider favorable to them effectively concedes that they are 
challenging the trial court's factual finding set forth on the record. The judge considered 
all the facts and ruled against the Jensens based on substantial evidence. 
The trial court's finding on the record is supported by substantial evidence and 
by his finding of a lack of credibility on the part of the Jensens. It should be upheld. 
VIII. THE JENSENS' ARGUMENT ATTACKING THE COURTS' FINDING THAT ORLOB Is 
ENTITLED TO SOME SHARE OF THE COMMISSIONS Is MISPLACED. 
The Jensens attack FOF fi fl 23-24, that Orlob is entitled to commission 
payments under the Combined Agreement, the Jensens again fail to marshall the 
evidence that supports Orlob's entitlement to receive commission payments, including 
all of the evidence set forth in Part I, above, on the doctrine of practical construction. 
Instead, they focus on the lack of evidence that PCG is entitled to receive, or ever 
received a commission payment, and attempt to turn the trial court's dilemma on its 
head. There was, indeed, no evidence introduced to show that PCG was entitled to 
receive, or ever in fact received, a single commission payment. All of the evidence 
showed that Orlob was entitled to receive, and did receive, each commission payment 
made and in fact was the recipient of an IRS form 1099 for commission payments. 
Since the Jensens made no effort to marshall the evidence that Orlob was in fact 
42 
entitled to receive the commission payments, they cannot argue that the trial court was 
in error for awarding damages for commission payments not paid to Orlob. Their effort 
to turn the Court's dilemma on its head is not well taken, and Orlob should prevail on 
his own point of appeal on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment should be reversed as to the sum of 
damages. This Court should order the amount of judgment to be doubled, based on 
Orlob's entitlement to 100% of the commission payments under the Combined 
Agreement, and in all other respects, the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of December, 2004. 
PETERS SCOFIELD P R I C E / ^ X 
C A Professional Corporation/ \ 
DAVID W. SCOFIELD 
Attorneys for David L. Orlob 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief and Appellee's Brief were mailed, 
postage prepaid, this day of December, 2004, to the following: 
James C. Haskins 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES 
357 South 200 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David W. Scofield 
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APPENDIX 1 
James C. Haskins (1406) l 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendants 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2827 
Telephone: (801)539-0234 
Facsimile: (801)539-5210 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L ORLOB, : 
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL 
MEMORANDUM 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
WASATCH MEDICAL MANAGEMENT, : 
a Utah general partnership : 
KENNETH C. JENSEN, individually : Civil No. 910901061CN 
and as general partner of Wasatch : 
Medical Management, EARLENE B. : Judge Bohling 
JENSEN, individually and as : 
general partner of Wasatch : 
Medical Management, STEVEN : 
K.JENSEN, individually and : 
as general partner of Wasatch : 
Medical Management, and : 
KEVEN J. JENSEN, individually : 
and as general partner of : 
Wasatch Medical Management, : 
Defendants. 
The Defendants herein, by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby submit 
the following Trial Memorandum. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case arises from a "Combined Agreement" pursuant to which the 
Defendants purchased the assets and equipment of Professionars Control Group, Inc. 
("PCG"). It is the Defendants' position that it was the understanding of all parties that 
the assets that were the subject of the Combined Agreement were owned primarily by 
PCG. The Plaintiffs own deposition confirms this view. See Deposition of David L. 
Orlob at 8, 22-26, attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
The Plaintiff has taken the position that the right to receive payments under the 
Combined Agreement belonged exclusively to him, and not to PCG. Not only is this 
position inconsistent with the Plaintiffs own deposition, it also conflicts with the law 
governing corporations. The shareholders of corporations do not jointly own the assets 
of the corporation; rather, they own only a right to a share of the corporation's 
distribution of profits, if any. Thus, Plaintiff, as a named party to the Combined 
Agreement, did not jointly own the assets of the corporation. Instead, he was only a 
named party to the Combined Agreement because part of that agreement included a 
covenant not to compete with the Plaintiff individually. The issues in this case are: 
1. Whether, and to what extent, David L. Orlob has been properly paid for 
amounts due to him under the Combined Agreement, as modified by any 
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subsequent arrangements between the parties; and 
2. Whether, assuming the Court finds that additional amounts are now due to 
the Plaintiff, the Defendants are entitled to offsets from those amounts 
attributable to the Plaintiffs breach of the Combined Agreement in (a) 
competing directly with the Defendants' business in violation of the 
Combined Agreement; (b) failing to deliver physician billing contracts to 
the Defendants at a commission rate of six percent; and (c) failing to 
assist with the orderly transfer of the physician accounts from the 
Plaintiffs business to the Defendants' business. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In August, 1988, the Plaintiff and the Defendants entered into a Combined 
Agreement pursuant to which all of the assets of PCG were sold to the Defendants. 
The Defendant entered into a number of covenants and promises in the Agreement, the 
most significant of which are as follows: 
1. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Combined Agreement, Plaintiff Orlob 
agreed that "[f]or commissions paid and profits shared Orlob warrants that 
he will assist in the orderly transfer of all accounts to Jensens and assist 
Jensens to maintain the accounts over the life of this agreement." 
2. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Combined Agreement, "Orlob further 
agrees and warrants he will not compete directly or indirectly in Utah 
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against or adverse to Jensens in the billing and collection business for a 
period often years commencing August 1,1988. 
Pursuant to paragraph 8 of the Combined Agreement, "Orlob warrants that 
all listed anesthesiologists accounts must be willing to pay 6 percent of 
total collections for services rendered." 
Further, during the negotiations leading up to the Agreement, and 
consistent with his obligations under the agreement as set forth above, 
Orlob assured the Defendants that all of PCG's clients were satisfied with 
PCG's billing services, that they intended to remain clients of PCG, and 
that he would notify each one of the clients that Wasatch would be 
providing billing services instead of PCG. 
From the inception of the Agreement, the Plaintiff not only failed to assist 
in the transferring of the accounts, he failed to use his efforts to maintain 
those accounts. 
Many of the clients had, prior to the execution of the Combined 
Agreement, notified PCG and Oriob that they were extremely dissatisfied 
with PCG's billing services and that they were terminating PCG's services 
and going to have Wasatch render billing services for them for a fee of 
four percent of total collections. 
Prior to the Agreement's execution, Plaintiff told the clients that Wasatch 
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was a new and inexperienced company that was not charging enough to 
stay in business and that if Wasatch was still in business within two years 
of September 1988, that Plaintiff would refund the difference between 
what PCG had been charging and what Wasatch was going to charge 
them. 
At best, the Plaintiff only notified two of the clients that Wasatch would be 
providing billing services for them. 
Indeed, the Plaintiff informed several of the clients that Wasatch had not 
taken over PCG's accounts and that PCG had merely hired Jensens as 
additional employees of PCG. 
The clients became aware that Wasatch was indeed performing their 
billing services and demanded that Wasatch charge them a fee lower than 
the 6 percent fee agreed upon with PCG. 
In September, 1988, Plaintiff solicited the business of Dr. Frank Peterson, 
one of the clients listed on Schedule B of the Combined Agreement, and, 
on or about April 1,1989 began directly competing against Wasatch by 
performing billing services for Dr. Peterson. The Plaintiff initially 
undertook to service Dr. Peterson's account by relying on the assistance 
of his friend and employee, Tracey Kartsone, who at the time worked 
directly for Plaintiff Oriob and under his direction. 
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12. Pursuant to paragraph 18 of the Combined Agreement, "Orlob grants to 
Jensens a three-year lease on the present business premises wherein 
Jensens shall continue the business operations," and granted the Jensens 
an option to purchase the building. 
13. Wasatch fulfilled its lease obligations by making payments directly to the 
Plaintiff until 1990, when the Plaintiff defaulted on the loan and Wasatch 
was forced to begin making its lease payments directly to the mortgage 
company. 
14. On or about September 21,1989, the Plaintiff informed one of the 
Defendants' employees, Kathy Chapman, that he and a woman named 
Tracey" were moving to Los Angeles, California and were going to begin 
performing billing services for Dr. Frank Peterson, one of Wasatch Medical 
Management's billing accounts. 
15. When he notified Kathy Chapman of his intention to perform billing 
services for Dr. Peterson, the Plaintiff also remarked that "he didn't want to 
be around Wastach Medical Management's offices on the following 
Monday when Jensens found out that he had taken Dr. Frank Peterson's 
account from Wasatch Medical Management. 
16. After relocating to California, Plaintiff Orlob formed a new company in Los 
Angeles called Electronic Claims Management. Tracey Kartsone was one 
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of his employees and lived with him for a time. Tracey Kartsone did the 
billing for Dr. Frank Peterson. 
16. By letter to PCG dated September 12,1988, Dr. Richard Greene 
terminated the billing services of PCG. 
17. By letter to Plaintiff Orlob dated September 15,1988, Dr. Douglas Hill 
terminated the billing services of PCG. 
18. By letter dated September 26,1988, Dr. Stephen Shuput terminated the 
billing services of PCG. 
19. By letter dated November 1,1988, Dr. Donald Decker terminated the 
billing services of PCG. 
20. By letter dated November 28,1988, Dr. Craig Jensen terminated the 
billing services of PCG. 
21. By letter dated June 2,1989, Dr. Randall Stockham terminated the billing 
services of PCG. 
22. Drs. Farley, Shuput, and Hill met with Steve and Keven Jensen to express 
their displeasure at how the business transaction occurred and that they 
were now having and were continuing to have the billing done at 6 percent 
when they knew other people were having their billing done at 4 percent. 
23. Drs. Farley, Shuput and Hill advised Steve Jensen that they were 
empowered to represent a number of the physicians covered by the 
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Combined Agreement, and advised him that they would be changing 
billing services unless some compromise was made. 
24. As of the present date, the Defendants have paid to Plaintiff approximately 
$170,000.00 in cash and other benefits under the terms of the Combined 
Agreement. 
25. The Plaintiff did not personally own the assets of PCG; rather, those 
assets, including the contracts with the various physicians, were owned by 
the corporation. 
26. The Plaintiff agreed, explicitly or implicitly, to each and every reduction 
made by the Defendants to amounts due him under the Combined 
Agreement, 
27. The Plaintiff failed to list any amount allegedly due to him in the 
statements and schedules he filed in his bankruptcy proceeding in California. 
Consequently, the Plaintiff has in effect admitted that his interest in the 
Combined Agreement had no value or minimal value. 
ARGUMENT 
Simply as a factual matter, the Defendants have complied with all of their 
obligations under the Combined Agreement, at least until they purchased the interest of 
PCG in that agreement from the IRS. At that point, they ceased making payments to 
the Plaintiff. Subsequently, the Utah Court of Appeals determined that Plaintiff Orlob, 
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individually, had some undefined interest in the Combined Agreement and remanded 
the case to this Court to determine the nature and amount of that interest. The Court of 
Appeals found that Orlob's covenants "require[d] Orlob's individual performance; 
performance solely by PCG does not suffice." Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Managment, 
33 P.3d 1078,1081 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). Consequently, this Court must now 
determine the value of Orlob's interest in the agreement. 
To begin with, of course, after he filed the instant action, Plaintiff Orlob filed a 
petition in bankruptcy with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of 
California wherein he did not list his interest on his statements and schedules as an 
asset of his bankruptcy estate. Thus, by his own admission, his interest in the 
Combined Agreement had little or no value. 
Second, Orlob's complete failure to perform any of his obligations under the 
agreement absolved the Plaintiffs from any further duty to perform pursuant to its terms. 
There is simply no dispute in this case that Orlob failed to honor his express 
agreements to (1) not compete with the Defendants in their business; (2) provide for the 
orderly transfer of the physician accounts from his own business to the Defendants' 
business; and (3) insure that the physicians who transferred their business to the 
Defendants were willing to pay a six percent commission for the billing services 
performed by the Defendants. 
It is well settled that parties to a contract are obliged to proceed in good faith and 
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to cooperate in the performance of the contract in accordance with its expressed intent. 
Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982). One who enters into a contract must 
cooperate in good faith to carry out the intention of the parties when the contract was 
made. Weber Meadow-View Corp. V. Wilde, 575 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1978). The Plaintiff, 
however, immediately commenced to compete with the Defendants in contravention of 
the Agreement, by arranging for his own employee to do the billing for Dr. Frank 
Peterson. Dr. Peterson was one of the physicians whose billing contract was 
transferred to the Defendants. 
Additionally, there is not a scintilla of evidence in this case that Plaintiff Orlob 
ever did anything at all to assist in the orderly transfers of the physicians accounts to the 
Defendants. Indeed, he actively undermined that process by telling physician clients 
that the Defendants had not purchased the billing contracts and instead were merely his 
own employees. Such conduct cannot be seen as a good faith attempt to meet his 
obligations under the contract. A party who is seeking to enforce a contract must prove 
performance of his own obligations. Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp,, 883 P.2d 295 
(Utah Ct.App. 1994). 
A material breach by one party to a contract excuses further performance by the 
non-breaching party. Anderson v. Doms, 984 P.2d 392 (Utah Ct App. 1999). What 
constitutes a material breach of a contract is a question of fact. Coalville City v. 
Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). As the facts of this case abundantly 
Page 10 
demonstrate, the Plaintiff Orlob materially breached the Combined Agreement by failing 
to perform on any of his commitments pursuant to the contract. Under such 
circumstances, the Plaintiff should be deemed entitled to little, if any, additional 
compensation under the terms of the Combined Agreement 
DATED this Z& day of June, 2002. 
— ~ - ^ — ^ r 4v\«-Air 
-Oames C. Haskins 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendants' Trial 
Memorandum was served on the 20th day of June, 2002, by hand delivery to the offices 
of Plaintiffs counsel as follows: 
David Scofield, Esq. 
David Burns, Esq. 
PARSONS DAVIES KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
homas N. ThWnp^bn 
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